

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

ASHLEY ANN COLEMAN,
TDCJ No. 2287214,

Petitioner,

V.

STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent.

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No. 3:22-cv-2723-E-BN

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Petitioner Ashley Ann Coleman, a Texas prisoner, filed a *pro se* application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 collaterally attacking her 2021 Dallas County conviction for murder, which resulted in a sentence of 19 years of incarceration. *See State v. Coleman*, F-1775361-W (363d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall. Cnty., Tex. Sept. 24, 2019); Dkt. No. 3 at 1.

United States District Judge Ada Brown referred Coleman's habeas petition to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, under the circumstances here and for the reasons and to the extent set out below, the Court should dismiss the federal habeas challenge under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (Habeas Rule 4).

Legal Standards and Analysis

Habeas Rule 4 allows a district court to summarily dismiss a habeas

application “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” *Id.*; see also *Kiser v. Johnson*, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (“This rule differentiates habeas cases from other civil cases with respect to *sua sponte* consideration of affirmative defenses. The district court has the power under [Habeas] Rule 4 to examine and dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other pleading by the state. This power is rooted in “the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes)).

While “the statute of limitations provision of the AEDPA is an affirmative defense rather than jurisdictional,” a district court may dismiss a time barred Section 2254 application *sua sponte* under Habeas Rule 4. *Kiser*, 163 F.3d at 329. But, “‘before acting on its own initiative’ to dismiss an apparently untimely § 2254 petition as time barred, a district court ‘must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.’” *Wyatt v. Thaler*, 395 F. App’x 113, 114 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (cleaned up; quoting *Day v. McDonough*, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006)).

Under the circumstances here, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide Coleman fair notice, and the opportunity to file objections to them (further explained below) affords a chance to present to the Court her position as to the limitations concerns explained below. See, e.g., *Ingram v. Dir., TDCJ-CID*, No. 6:12cv489, 2012 WL 3986857, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2012) (a magistrate

judge's report and recommendation gives the parties "fair notice that the case may be dismissed as time-barred, which [gives a petitioner] the opportunity to file objections to show that the case should not be dismissed based on the statute of limitation" (collecting cases)).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) "introduced both 'simple logic' to the federal habeas landscape and uniform rules for federal courts to apply." *Wallace v. Mississippi*, 43 F.4th 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Smith v. Titus*, 141 S. Ct. 982, 987 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of cert.), then citing *Day*, 547 U.S. at 202 n.1).

"Namely, it implemented a host of greatly needed procedural requirements for petitioners seeking habeas relief." *Id.* (citing *Brown v. Davenport*, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022) ("In many ways, the statute represented a sea change in federal habeas law.")). One such requirement is "the one-year period for an individual in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment to file a § 2254 petition for habeas relief" that "begins running from the latest of four events." *Id.* at 497 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)):

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from the limitations period. *See id.* § 2244(d)(2).

The one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling – “a discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case,” *Fisher v. Johnson*, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999), and only applies in “rare and exceptional circumstances,” *United States v. Riggs*, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing *Davis v. Johnson*, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[A] litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” *Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States*, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).

Taking the second prong first, “[a] petitioner’s failure to satisfy the statute of limitations must result from external factors beyond his control; delays of the petitioner’s own making do not qualify.” *Hardy v. Quarterman*, 577 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted). This “prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary *and* beyond [the litigant’s] control.” *Menominee Indian Tribe*, 577 U.S. at 257; *see, e.g., Farmer v. D&O Contractors*, 640 F. App’x 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that because “the FBI did not actually prevent Farmer or any

other Plaintiff from filing suit” but instead “advised Farmer that filing suit would have been against the FBI’s interest” and “that the RICO claims could be filed after the investigation concluded,” “[a]ny obstacle to suit was ... the product of Farmer’s mistaken reliance on the FBI, and a party’s mistaken belief is not an extraordinary circumstance” (citation omitted)).

But “[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.’ What a petitioner did both before and after the extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing may indicate whether he was diligent overall.” *Jackson v. Davis*, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Holland*, 560 U.S. at 653; footnote omitted).

A showing of “actual innocence” can also overcome AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See *McQuiggin v. Perkins*, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). But the actual innocence gateway is only available to a petitioner who presents “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” *Id.* at 401 (quoting *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). That is, the petitioner’s new, reliable evidence must be enough to persuade the Court that “no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.* at 386 (quoting *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 329); see also *Johnson v. Hargett*, 978 F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that the term ‘actual innocence’ means *factual*, as opposed to *legal*, innocence – ‘legal’ innocence, of course, would arise whenever a constitutional violation by itself requires reversal,

whereas ‘actual’ innocence, as the Court stated in *McCleskey [v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)], means that the person did not commit the crime.” (footnotes omitted)); *Acker v. Davis*, 693 F. App’x 384, 392-93 (5th Cir 2017) (per curiam) (“Successful gateway claims of actual innocence are ‘extremely rare,’ and relief is available only in the ‘extraordinary case’ where there was ‘manifest injustice.’” (quoting *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 324, 327)).

Coleman did not appeal her murder conviction. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 3 at 2-3.

So the state criminal judgment she now challenges under Section 2254 became final for federal-limitations purposes on the thirtieth day after it was imposed (September 24, 2019) that was not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday – which was October 24, 2019. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1).

And, although Coleman sought state habeas relief through a petition filed no sooner than October 26, 2021, *see Ex parte Coleman*, No. W17-75361-W(A) (363d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall. Cnty. Tex.), which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the CCA) denied without written order on the findings of the trial court without a hearing and on the CCA’s independent review of the record, *see Ex parte Coleman*, WR-93,407-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2022), “[b]ecause [Coleman’s] state habeas petition was not filed within the one-year period” that commenced on October 24, 2019, the petition “did not statutorily toll the limitation clock,” *Palacios v. Stephens*, 723 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing *Scott v. Johnson*, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (in turn citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2))).

So Coleman’s Section 2254 petition is more than two years too late, as it was

filed no sooner than December 2, 2022, the date on which she certifies that it was placed in the prison mailing system. *See* Dkt. No. 3 at 17; *see also* RULE 3(d), RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (“A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing.”); *Uranga v. Davis*, 893 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2018) (“We reaffirm that the operative date of the prison mailbox rule remains the date the pleading is delivered to prison authorities.”).

It should therefore be denied as untimely under Section 2244(d)(1)(A) absent statutory or equitable tolling of the limitations period.

But Coleman neither relies on another provision of Section 2244(d)(1), nor advances a claim of tolling under the narrow actual innocence gateway, nor establishes either prong of equitable tolling – that she pursued her rights diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance beyond her control prevented the timely filing of the federal habeas petition.

As to equitable tolling, however, Coleman does seem to allege that her defense counsel “did not explain that [she] had the right under certain laws to file any petitioner or writs of appeals if [she] was being wrongfully, unlawfully convicted.” Dkt. No. 3 at 16. But, while “complete attorney abandonment can qualify as an extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes,” *Manning v. Epps*, 688 F.3d 177, 184 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing *Maples v. Thomas*, 565 U.S. 266, 281-82 (2012)), Coleman does not allege abandonment, and “mere attorney error or neglect” – which, at most, may be what Coleman does allege – “is not an extraordinary

circumstance such that equitable tolling is justified,” *Cousin v. Lensing*, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002); *see also United States v. Riggs*, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is irrelevant to the tolling decision.”).

The Court should therefore dismiss this action with prejudice as time barred.

Recommendation and Directions to Clerk


Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court should dismiss Petitioner Ashley Ann Coleman’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application as time barred. And the Court should direct that the Clerk of Court serve any order accepting or adopting this recommendation on the Texas Attorney General.

The Clerk shall serve electronically a copy of this recommendation and the petition, along with any attachments thereto and brief in support thereof, on the Texas Attorney General as counsel for Respondent, directed to the attention of Edward L. Marshall, Chief, Criminal Appeals Division, Texas Attorney General’s Office. *See* RULE 4, RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: December 28, 2022

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. Horan', is written over a horizontal line.

DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE